Cambridge Assessment International Education

Cambridge O Level

HISTORY **2147/21**

Paper 2 **October/November 2023**

2 hours

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **all** the questions on **one** option only.
  - Option A: Nineteenth century topic
  - Option B: Twentieth century topic
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].

This document has **12** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

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Option A: Nineteenth century topic

DID THE SECOND MOROCCAN CRISIS COME CLOSE TO CAUSING A WAR?

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer **all** the questions.

Background Information

Some historians have claimed that the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911 nearly caused war. The German action of sending the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir in July 1911 caused tensions with both Britain and France, especially because German intentions were not clear. Tensions were increased later in the month when Lloyd George, a senior member of the British government, made a speech warning Germany that Britain would defend its interests. The crisis was ended by negotiations between France and Germany in November 1911. These led to a secret agreement in which Germany accepted France's position in Morocco in return for some territory in Africa. When news of the agreement leaked out, it was heavily criticised in Germany.

Did the crisis nearly cause war?

SOURCE A

The Second Moroccan Crisis began when France sent troops to the city of Fez to prevent rebellions by some tribes. The Sultan of Morocco had been forced to get help from France. On 1 July 1911, a gunboat was sent by Germany to the port of Agadir in Morocco. The gunboat, called the *Panther*, was meant to scare the French. Germany wanted to separate France and Britain and to maintain Germany as a strong European power. The *Panther* caused tensions between Britain and Germany because of the competition between their navies. Britain saw the gunboat's arrival as part of Germany's plan to create a naval base on Morocco's Atlantic coast and to interfere with its naval domination of the Atlantic Ocean.

Germany's actions did not come close to causing a war. Germany was still unable to break apart the alliance between France and Britain, and France and Germany made an agreement. France would be allowed to continue its activity in Morocco without Germany intervening if it gave something back to Germany. As a result, Germany got parts of the French Congo in Africa. Germany got the bad end of the deal. It was given land that nobody wanted. Moreover, France now had full permission to make Morocco into a protectorate.

From a recent account of the Second Moroccan Crisis.

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SOURCE B

Germany's intervention in Morocco was a return to a policy of seeking colonial success in order to arouse national feeling at home and stop socialist success in elections. It almost led to war. It was inspired by a French move to put down native disorders in Morocco. French troops were sent to Fez and Germany realised this would take effective power from the Sultan of Morocco and thus break the agreement made after the First Moroccan Crisis. In return for increased French control of Morocco, Germany decided it wanted some French territory in central Africa. To make its ambitions clear, Germany decided to send warships to Morocco and land troops there. Three warships were sent: the *Panther* was the first to arrive on 1 July. The British government was unclear about German intentions, but because of the naval rivalry with Germany it became convinced there was a plan for a German attack on its fleet. This wrecked any chance of an agreement with Britain, and of Germany splitting the Entente. Confronted with French determination not to yield, and its belief that the British were only waiting for the call to stand with the French, Germany backed down. In return for worthless land in the Congo area, which was not worth the great risk Germany had taken, it recognised the French protectorate over Morocco. This was a real setback for German diplomacy, and the colonial success, which it wanted above all else, was not forthcoming.

From a recent account of the Second Moroccan Crisis.

SOURCE C

GERMAN EMPEROR. "A STRONG FLEET IS THE BEST GUARANTEE OF PEACE!"
M. FALLIÈRES. "QUITE SO! TO MAKE A CERTAINTY OF IT, HERE IS *OUR* CONTRIBUTION."

A British cartoon published on 12 September 1911. Fallières was President of France.

SOURCE D

The Germans might attempt a surprise attack against our navy. The German High Seas Fleet has put to sea and vanished. Let's suppose, instead of going to Norway as announced, it has gone straight for Portland, preceded by a division of destroyers which could launch a surprise night torpedo attack. This could bring the main German fleet into action at dawn against our ships which would be without steam, without coal, without crews.

From a British newspaper, 21 July 1911. The British and German navies had arranged joint naval exercises in Norwegian waters. Portland was a major British naval base where some Dreadnoughts were based.

SOURCE E

We are in a satisfactory position of having twice as many Dreadnoughts as Germany AND A NUMBER GREATER BY ONE THAN THE WHOLE OF THE REST OF THE WORLD PUT TOGETHER! I don't think there is the very faintest fear of war! How lucky we are! Just when there is a tendency to ease down our naval activities comes AGADIR!

Admiral Fisher, head of the British navy, to a member of the British government, 1 August 1911.

SOURCE F

Now we know where Britain stands. Like a flash of lightning in the night, these events have shown the German people where the enemy is. We know now, when we wish to expand in the world, when we wish to have our place in the sun, who it is that lays claim to world-wide domination. Gentleman, we Germans are not in the habit of permitting this sort of thing and the German people will know how to reply. We shall secure peace, not by concessions, but with the German sword.

From a speech in the Reichstag by Ernst von Heydebrand, leader of the German Conservative Party, November 1911. He was responding to the Franco-German agreement over Morocco and was greeted with thunderous applause.

SOURCE G

The only real crisis in Anglo-German relations between 1904 and 1914 was in the summer of 1911 over the Morocco dispute with France. Senior members of the German government lacked any talent for dealing with Britain and did damage by their sloppy handling of the affair. They sent the gunboat *Panther* to Morocco on 1 July 1911. Though the British government demanded an explanation, our government left them in the dark about our intentions for several weeks. The result was Lloyd George's speech warning that Britain would side with France if it was challenged.

I was off duty and about to leave on my summer holiday when I learned about the sending of the *Panther*. I believed this show of power was a mistake. We did not want to go to war and the German government made a blunder when it did not reveal its intentions. We gave later assurances that we never considered demanding Moroccan territory and it looked as if we were backing away from Britain's raised sword.

From the memoirs of Grand Admiral Tirpitz, published in 1919. Tirpitz was in charge of the German navy, but was forced to resign in 1916.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [7]

2 Study Source C.

What is the cartoonist's message? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

3 Study Sources D and E.

How far does Source E make Source D surprising? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

4 Study Source F.

Why did Heydebrand make this speech at that time? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

5 Study Source G.

Do you trust this account of the crisis over Morocco? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

6 Study **all** the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Europe was very close to war in 1911? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

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Option B: Twentieth century topic

WHY DID THE SOVIETS USE MILITARY FORCE IN HUNGARY IN NOVEMBER 1956?

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer **all** the questions.

Background Information

On 23 October 1956 demonstrations in Hungary began to get out of control. The demonstrators demanded independence from the Soviet Union and political freedom for the people of Hungary. On 24 October Soviet tanks entered Budapest and fighting soon broke out across Hungary. The Soviets agreed to a new government led by Imre Nagy and to a ceasefire. Nagy then announced a series of reforms including Hungary's neutrality and its departure from the Warsaw Pact. On 30 October the Soviet Union declared its readiness to withdraw troops from Hungary. However, the Soviet leaders changed their minds the next day and on 4 November Soviet tanks moved into Budapest.

Why did the Soviets resort to military force in November 1956? Was it because of Nagy's decision to leave the Warsaw Pact, a fear that the demonstrations might spread to other countries in the Eastern Bloc, or that 'counter-revolutionaries' might seize power in Hungary? How far were external factors, like the crisis in Suez, responsible for the Soviets' decision?

Was fear of a counter-revolution the main reason why the Soviets used military force in Hungary in November 1956?

SOURCE A

Khrushchev was worried that Soviet withdrawal from Hungary would be seen as weakness by the West. He was also concerned about hardliners in Moscow who wanted more firm action to be taken, and by Nagy's announcements (27 to 30 October) that he would include non-communists in his government, dissolve the secret police, and achieve greater independence from the Soviet Union by withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. It took the Soviets between 24 and 31 October to decide what to do and the decision on 30 October to withdraw troops was only a temporary position while they came to a final decision. By 30 October, they were already very concerned by Nagy's actions and his weak leadership. Their major worry was that an independent Hungary, and the possibility of demands for independence spreading to the USSR's satellite states, would undermine the USSR's power in the Eastern Bloc. By 31 October, reasons for a tough stance were overwhelming and Soviet tanks reappeared on 4 November. The use of military force by the Soviets and the defeat of the revolution had always been inevitable.

From a recent history book.

SOURCE B

The Soviet decision to send in tanks on 4 November to defeat the revolution surprised everybody because Khrushchev had promised an end to Stalin's repressive methods. On 31 October the Soviets had withdrawn their troops from Budapest and issued a statement promising to enter into negotiations over the issue of Soviet troops in Hungary. The revolution seemed to be on the verge of success. On the very same day the Soviet leadership suddenly and completely changed its mind and decided to end the revolution violently. It seems that the Soviets were worried that Nagy was losing control of the situation and that Hungary could fall to counter-revolutionaries who were far more extreme than him. Khrushchev was concerned that if he did not act, he would look weak in comparison with the British, French and Israelis, whose actions in Suez had begun on 29 October.

From a recent history book.

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SOURCE C

A cartoon published in Britain, 28 November 1956. The figures sitting represent President Nasser of Egypt, and Israel, Britain and France. The figure standing represents the United Nations.

SOURCE D

What decision should we make?

The counter-revolution might have temporarily gained the upper hand, then a lot of the workers' blood would have been shed. And if NATO penetrated into the socialist countries through Hungary, it would have been dangerous.

I considered what the consequences would be if we did not give a helping hand to the Hungarian working class and the counter-revolutionary elements became stronger. They were beginning to control the government headed by Nagy. Around him were emigrants who fled the country after the establishment of socialism in Hungary, and had returned. This indicated the direction of the development of events if the counter-revolution won. We decided that it would be unforgivable if we did not help the Hungarian working class and decided to use our troops.

From Khrushchev's memoirs, published in 1971.

SOURCE E

We should re-examine our assessment and should not withdraw troops from Hungary. We have no other choice. If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans – the imperialists. They will see it as weakness on our part and will go on the offensive. We would then expose the weakness of our position. The Soviet Communist Party members will not accept it if we withdraw. To Egypt they will then add Hungary.

Khrushchev speaking to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the main decision-making body of the USSR, 31 October 1956.

SOURCE F



A cartoon published in Hungary in 1956. The words on the coat covering the horse say, 'Democracy, freedom, independence, our own way'. The words at the bottom say, 'And what's beneath it'. The figure on the right is a Soviet soldier.

SOURCE G



A cartoon published in the Netherlands, November 1956. The caption read, 'Law and Order are restored again.' The writing on the flag says, 'Long live freedom' and 'Hungary'.

SOURCE H

I asked Kovács how much truth there was in the Russian assertion that the revolution had become a counter-revolution and therefore Russian intervention was justified. 'No! This was a genuine revolution from inside,' Kovács said, 'led by Communists who fought for it during the first few days. Non-Communists like me came forward and demanded a share in Hungary's future. This was granted by Nagy. True, there was a small fringe of extremists, and there were some who had ties with the exiled Nazis, but at no time was their strength such as to cause concern.'

'Then there was no reason why the Russians should have come again and destroyed the revolution?' 'None,' Kovács replied, 'unless they are trying to revert to the old Stalinist days. But if that is what they really are trying – and at the moment it looks like it – they will fail.'

An interview between an American journalist and Belá Kovács, 4 November 1956, in a cellar where Kovács was hiding from the Soviet army. Kovács had opposed the Communists in Hungary after the Second World War and had been imprisoned. In November 1956, he became a member of Nagy's government. The interview was published in an American newspaper in December 1956.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [7]

2 Study Source C.

What is the cartoonist's message? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

3 Study Sources D and E.

How far does Source E make Source D surprising? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

4 Study Sources F and G.

How far would these two cartoonists have agreed about events in Hungary? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

5 Study Source H.

How useful is this source as evidence about the Hungarian revolution? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

6 Study **all** the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that the Soviets used military force in Hungary in November 1956 to put down counter-revolution? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

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